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Of Bureaucrats' Brothers-in-Law and
Bankruptcy Taxes: Article 9 Filing Systems
and the Market for Information
James W. Bowers*
It has been... suggested that modern techniques for the collection
and communication of credit information have made filing systems unnecessary and obsolete. A businessman or banker, it is said, in determining whether to extend credit or make a loan relies, not on public
records, but on financial statements-balance sheets and profit and
loss statements-submitted to him or to a specialized credit information agency by the prospective borrower. Public files, even if they are
easily available, will be rarely consulted; they can in any case never be
relied on since no filing system, including that established by Article 9,
is comprehensive in the sense that a check of the files will reveal all
possible encumbrances .... Since these statements are the best available, indeed the only available, sources of comprehensive credit information, and since they are in fact regularly relied on in granting credit
and loans, they should, the argument runs, be made the basis of a truly
modern system of creditor protection: public files should be scrapped
and appropriate safeguards introduced to protect people misled by
false or incomplete statements.
Grant Gilmore 1

Scholars interested in understanding the justification for
the creation of state agencies often begin to develop their insights by examining the role of government. The literature
seeking to understand the public filing system created by Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), however, has neglected this perspective. In fact, the debate over the filing of notice of security interests illustrates a fundamental disagreement
among scholars about the proper role of legislation. For in* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. I am grateful to Richard Epstein and Robert Ellickson for conversations that pointed me
toward the thoughts developed in this study. The benefit I obtained from my
friendship with Richard J. Dodson, a distinguished admiralty practitioner, will
be obvious to my readers. I also had important guidance along the way from
John Bigelow, John Church, Dean Lueck, Andy Kiet, Lucy McGough, and especially Bill Hawkland. Those who offer directions, however, bear no responsibility for any wrong turns that occur on the trip. I take responsibility for having
been the driver.
1. 1 GRANT GmIoRE, SECURIT INTEREsTS IN PERSONAL PROPRTY 463-64
(1965).
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stance, some view government as necessary to solve collective
action problems. 2 They believe that when markets cannot supply the optimal level of services, it is desirable to have the government supply them. Government, according to this view,
positively contributes to social welfare by fostering optimal
levels of cooperation among the participants in a society. In theory, the Article 9 filing system might be viewed as just such a
measure.
Disquiet is growing, however, about this sanguine belief in
the beneficence of governmental regulation of commercial law.
Theorists who share this rising level of concern subscribe to a
more skeptical view of the value of bureaucracies. They suspect
that governments exist largely to permit politically victorious
bureaucrats and interest groups to exploit the rest of society. 3
One way of demonstrating that these suspicions are realistic is
to show that the existing explanations for the Article 9 filing system are implausible, and that the system is not a credible response to any well-recognized type of collective action problem. 4
That is the task that I undertake in this Article.
In Part I, I briefly outline the history of the most recently
adopted version of the Article 9 filing system, that of Louisiana.
In Part II, I ask whether the filing system actually advances
welfare better than the market for information acting alone. I
argue that there is little reason to believe that we need legislation to foster the appropriate level and kind of cooperation
among those dealing in our financial markets, and urge that
there is much to suggest that the filing system is little more
than a rip-off. In Part HI, I posit that even if these concerns are
unjustified, and a filing system might theoretically enhance welfare, there remains the question of whether the existing system
is well designed to do so. I argue that the existing system offers
a costly and ineffective way of delivering whatever social benefits filing is supposed to provide for us. I also question the wisdom of what appears to be a growing consensus that we need a
2. See, e.g., RIcHARD E. WAGNER, PuBLic FINANCE 130 (1983) (describing a
model that views government as a means to provide some services more efficiently than the free market).
3. Id.
4. That the filing system may be the result of such exploitation does not
condemn it, of course. For example, those who object to secured lending will
not wish to resist permitting those engaged in the practice from being exploited.
Thoughtful opponents of secured lending, however, might not be enthusiastic
about wasteful measures that discourage the practice if there were cheaper
means of making secured lending appear undesirable to prospective lenders
and borrowers.
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whiz-bang, national, centralized computerized system. In Part
IV, I argue that the troubles with the system are organizational,
not technological. I urge that private, local filing systems would
be likely to deliver services most efficiently. Technological issues tend to solve themselves once we provide the proper organization. Indeed, an appropriately designed organizational
structure would minimize the damage done by an exploitative
filing system.
I accept, in this Article, the assumption of the revisors of
Article 9 that permitting parties to contract for security interests fosters socially beneficial conduct to the extent that secured
lending ought not to be made more difficult or expensive as a
matter of UCC policy. 5 I conclude, however, that the proper application of such a policy would mandate that the requirement
for filing be lifted from the backs of those who contract to grant
or take security. Because the filing system exploits secured
lenders and borrowers, it should be abolished in order to eliminate the exploitation, or at least reorganized to minimize the
level of bureaucratic brigandage.
I. THE LOUISIANA COMPROMISE: AN HISTORICAL
VIGNETTE
Louisiana, where I live, was the last of the fifty states to
adopt Article 9 of the UCC. 6 Were we twenty years late in
adopting this legislation because our bankers and borrowers
failed to see it as an improvement over a pre-code security device
system that resembled the systems Article 9 replaced in our sister states? Almost assuredly not. Louisiana is home to a large
oil industry and is the source of significant commerce transacted
at the outlet to the Mississippi, and thus needs a modern commercial law as sophisticated as that of any state. In addition, for
years prior to our enactment of Article 9, our local member on
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) was William D. Hawkland. Not only was he
the chancellor of our state's flagship public law school, perhaps
5.

See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM CoMMEmCIAL CODE ARICLE 9: REPORT 8-9
(1992) [hereinafter PEB REPORT] (recommending that those opposing the institution of secured lending do so by amending the Bankruptcy Code or changing
the priority rules directly instead of simply making it expensive to perfect security interests).
6. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-101 (West 1988) (effective Jan. 1, 1990).
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the most famous UCC scholar in the country, 7 and a well-known
long-time member of the Permanent Editorial Board to boot, he
was also an unceasing advocate and lobbyist for Article 9 in the
Louisiana legislature.
What delayed the adoption of Article 9 in Louisiana was the
implacable opposition of the Louisiana clerks of court. More perhaps than many states, Louisiana possesses a fully flowered local spoils system; political power resides at the courthouses.
Under our pre-code security device law, parties filed multiplepage security contracts in full with the local clerks. At a onedollar-per-page filing fee, clerks historically earned a stream of
revenue that enabled them to supply employment to their political allies and brothers-in-law." They were understandably reluctant to see this pre-Code revenue stream replaced by a three
dollar fee for a one-page UCC-19 for each transaction, especially
were it to be filed with the secretary of state under Article 9,
instead of the local courthouse organization.
Multiple-page, multiple-location filings provide far better
sources of revenue for a spoils system than Article 9. Article 9's
adoption in Louisiana, then, became contingent on a formula
that would preserve the spoils system. A deal was struck. Filing fees for a financing statement in Louisiana are fifteen dollars
per form, 10 and most of that money is paid to the local clerks of
court. The balance goes to the secretary of state, who maintains
a technologically whiz-bang, computerized, central filing system. 1 All filing is done, however, with the local clerks, who simply fax copies of all the financing statements to Baton Rouge,
and eventually pay the secrecollect the fees, live off the float,
12
tary of state his or her share.
7.

See, e.g.,

WILLIAM

D.

HAWKLAND,

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

SERIES

(1982) (multi-volume treatise).
8. In folklore, the term a "brother-in-law" deal, which suggests something
less than an efficiency driven arms-length transaction, is not unique to Louisiana. By employing this linguistic convention I do not mean to imply that the
Louisiana court clerks are necessarily sexist. Many of the parties to their
brother-in-law deals are undoubtedly sisters-in-law, daughters-in-law, and
mothers-in-law as well. Inasmuch as I have never perceived a strident demand
by those who insist on gender neutral modes of expression for identifying corruption as closely with female as male actors, I employ the masculine term here
strictly on account of a reader's likely familiarity with it.
9. U.C.C. § 9-402 (1990).
10. LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-405(2).
11. WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, HAWKLAND'S HANDBOOK ON CHAPTER 9 LouIsiANA COMMERCIAL LAW

§ 4:08, at 21 (1989).

12. Id. § 4:08. The Louisiana system, which puts all the fees received at
the disposal of the bureaucracies that collect them, may not be typical. The
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Chancellor Hawkland had advocated that Louisiana adopt
an even more technologically advanced filing system, in which
every lawyer with a computer and a modem could file electronically, directly with the secretary of state's central computer, and
could also search the filings from her own desk. Sadly, however,
Louisiana's secured parties are walking to the fax machine at
the courthouse as a tribute to the spoils system. This history is
9 filing
probative of the point I raise in this Article: The Article
3
device.'
rent-seeking
a
than
more
little
system is
II. THE ARTICLE 9 FILING SYSTEM IS PROBABLY
UNNECESSARY; IF ITS SERVICES WERE TRULY
VALUABLE, THE MARKET WOULD
EFFICIENTLY PROVIDE THEM
The Article 9 filing system provides nothing other than a
simple commodity-information.' 4 The market for information
could probably efficaciously do whatever the filing system bureaucracies do and at a lesser aggregate resource cost. The system is justifiable only if it is the most efficient way of providing
the services we ask it to perform; the system should deliver benefits that equal or exceed its costs. There are serious theoretical
and empirical reasons to believe that the current filing system
probably does not deliver its services efficiently.
polar opposite is found in Minnesota, where all fees collected are added to the
general revenue accounts of the state and the expenses of running the filing
system are paid for by legislative appropriations to the appropriate bureaucracies. Telephone Interview with Katherine A. Engler, Staff Attorney for the
Minnesota Secretary of State (Oct. 1994). Whichever funding mechanism a
state chooses, however, there is reason to believe that on the whole, the filing
system is used as a revenue-raising measure. See infra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing political impetus to charge filing fees).

13. Other scholars have recently seemed to be coming to agreement on this
argument. See, e.g., Douglas Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 V_& L.
REv. 2249, 2271 (1994) ("Radical change that is desirable in theory may not be
desirable in practice, because of the uncertainties inherent in implementing
new ideas. Even if we desired such change, the political forces that are in place
may prevent even the most sensible reforms in such things as the filing system."); Paul M. Shupack, On Boundaries and Definitions: A Commentary on
Dean Baird, 80 V. L. REV. 2273, 2273 n.1 (1994) (noting difficulty in making
changes "in the face of entrenched people whose interests are served by continuing the present system. The Study Group heard reports from knowledgeable
people that running the [UCC] filing system costs states collectively between
$500,000,000 and $600,000,000 annually. That same system raises about
$900,000,000 for the several states.").
14. Cf 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 463-64 (indicating that Gilmore also
views filing as an information-providing device).
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FILiNG SYSTEMS ARE INEFFICIENT BY DESIGN

A glance at the legal explanations offered to justify filing
systems in general, from those that govern real estate transactions to those that deal with personal property, reveals that such
systems are theoretically inefficient by design. Transacting parties must file before they can make the benefits of their dealings
enforceable againststrangers. Those strangers who benefit from
the filing system are, in theory, quintessential external beneficiaries. External benefits,15like external costs, produce suboptimal resource allocations.
Creditors are apt to differ in the degree to which they rely
on the debtor's ownership of discrete assets before they agree to
make any loans. Secured parties are likely to rely more heavily
than others. Unsecured creditors who obtain judgments and
levy on a debtor's assets are less likely to have relied on the fact
that the debtor had clear title to any given asset when they adreliers
vanced credit to the borrower. Article 9 treats the likely
16
more favorably than it treats the likely nonrehers.
The flip side of this argument is that future secured lenders,
without the information that the filing system provides them,
might rely on having a first claim to already encumbered assets,
and thus have external costs imposed on them by earlier secured
lenders. Future secured lenders are assumed to be able to protect themselves if they have notice of a prior security interest
and if the filing system is capable of delivering them the necessary notice. Absent a filing system, however, these future secured lenders would not necessarily be so uninformed as to be
required to bear external costs.
Creating a filing system, on the other hand, may make them
into external beneficiaries. Because a lender ends up contracting with the borrower who possesses information that the
lender desires, a natural mechanism exists that assures that the
future lender could be induced to pay for the value of the infor15. The existence of externalities, in one form or another, commonly justifies having a service provided by the government rather than the market. I
therefore postpone analysis of this apparent theoretical defect inherent in filing
systems until Part IV, which addresses the potential for reorganizing the way
public agencies should run the system they have inherited. In this Part, I will
address the more direct costs and benefits that, it has been posited, might flow
from filing systems in general.
16. It is at least plausible, for example, that the reason lien creditors lose
to perfected secured creditors, see U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b), is that the secured creditor more likely relied on the existence of the collateral in the decision to extend
credit than did the lien creditor.
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mation he or she needs or desires. The current system, however,
has the future lender paying search fees to a bureaucracy rather
than buying the necessary information from the borrower and
agreeing to pay for it in setting the loan price term. The filing
system thus turns potential contractors into potential free riders. It also makes the previous secured lender a forced rider. 17
As a result, no one but the most optimistic fan of bureaucratic
decision making is apt to believe that the system is likely either
to collect or to disseminate the optimal quantity and quality of
information.
If the system was set up so that the users of the information
paid for the value they receive, we might draw a contrary conclusion. If we assume that fiers can costlessly provide the information the system requires them to disclose' 8 and that the fees
paid by the system searchers pays the cost of the system, we
would have some assurance that the system produced optimal
results. The irony of the current system, however, is that its
costs are probably paid not by the consumers of the information
in the form of search fees, but rather by the providers of the information in the form of filing fees. This fact alone makes a
prima facie case that the system is not producing efficient
outcomes.

17. The costs imposed on the earlier lender who is forced, by a filing requirement, to grant free information to his or her successors, may in fact be
shared between lenders and borrowers, depending on whether there are many
lenders bidding for the privilege of lending to few borrowers, or on whether
there are many borrowers bidding for the privilege of obtaining loans from few
lenders. In the latter case it is borrowers who are the forced riders.
18. This is an heroic assumption. Historians of filing systems have opined
that disclosure of private information was costly to the disclosing party, which
may have contributed to the desuetude of early filing systems. See, e.g., R.E.
MEGARRY & H.W.R. WADE, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 173 (1966) (pointing out
that the advantages of avoiding a recording system include avoiding publicity);
id. at 1047 (pointing out that modern English Land Registration records are not
made available for public inspection). That disclosure is costly is also recognized by modern-day economic theorists. See, e.g., EDMUND W. KrrcH, THE LIMrrS OF AccuRAcY ENHANCEMENT AS THE PURPOSE OF THE DIscLosuREs REQUIRED
BY THE SECURrrIES LAws 50 (University of Va. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Workshop, Working Paper No. 94-5, Sept. 2, 1993) (pointing out that disclosure will
not occur when firms find that secrecy is valuable to them).
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EFFICENT

Richard Epstein offers the most intriguing review of the economics of recording systems. 19 Although his analysis focuses on
fractionalized interests in real property (servitudes), what he
has to say easily applies to personal property filing systems like
that imposed by Article 9. His analysis is problematic, however,
whether applied to real or personal property.
1.

Grantor-Grantee Indexed Filing Systems Probably Do Not
Reduce Search Costs

Epstein's first argument is that recording systems cut down
20
the search costs of strangers desiring to bargain for property.
In the marginal case, a recording statute might plausibly reduce
some search costs, particularly under systems in which ownership interests rather than mere encumbrances are recorded.
This is not likely to be true, however, for the sort of filing system
that has typically been adopted for both real and personal property security interests. To illustrate, suppose I see the Happy
Acres Estate and desire to make an offer to buy it. A trip to my
local courthouse, where I can consult only a grantor-grantee indexing system in the land records, will not assist me. To use
such a system, I have to start with the name of a grantor or
grantee. Nothing in the recorder's office is indexed under "H" for
"Happy," so the system is unlikely to save me significant search
costs in identifying the owners. A title registration system,
which is relatively rare, or, more probably, a visit to the tax collector's office, where records are indexed by tract instead of by
party, will give me better information than the filing system
about whom I need to see in order to open negotiations.
Owners soliciting offers for their assets typically publicize
their ownership and their desire to enter into bargains in a local
market, rather than rely on the official record of their title as a
contact point between themselves and potential searching bargaining partners. If search cost savings sufficiently benefited
potential buyers and sellers of interests in assets, we would observe a strong, persistent demand for systems of title registraRichard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contractin the Law of SerREV. 1353 (1982).
20. Id. at 1354 ("The real problem ... arises when a third party wishes to
acquire an ownership interest in the subject property. The initial problem he
must face is to determine with whom he should deal.... A system of recorda").
tion reverses this general rule .
19.

vitudes, 55 S. CAL. L.
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tion. The history of recording systems, then, would not be the
story of evasion of such systems.
2.

Filing Systems Probably Do Not Significantly Lower
Authentication Costs

Epstein also contends that recording systems reduce the
costs incurred by any claimant of a fractional interest in property to prove that her title is valid because her predecessor's was
also valid. 2 1 This empirical assertion, however, is belied by the
history of recording systems. There probably are efficient ways
to authenticate a claim in the absence of a recording scheme.
Authentication costs would predictably be highest in the case of
long-lived assets that require proof of the occurrence of ancient
transactions. Recording schemes would thus seem much more
important for land than for personalty. The history of recording
of interests in land, however, is not a testament to the efficacy of
filing systems in reducing authentication or any other sort of
costs.

2 2

There are those even now of the opinion that participants in
the real estate market rely less on recording systems than on
alternative assurance techniques available to them in information markets. 23 Counsel representing lenders typically demand
the opinion of the borrower's counsel that the lender's mortgage
will constitute a valid first lien on the collateral, and counsel
representing the borrower frequently render such opinions without, necessarily, wholly relying on the public records.
Although ship mortgages must be filed to maintain their
preferred priority level, there has long been a host of maritime
liens that are enforceable against vessels (and that will even
take priority over a preferred ship mortgage) without ever being
21. Id. at 1354-55 ("Who will be prepared to buy a remainder interest or to
accept property as security for a loan, if faced with the specter of having to

authenticate title in a subsequent proceeding brought by a disappointed rival
claimant to the fee?").
22. See infra part H.C (summarizing history of recording interests in land).
Indeed, recording of land titles did not become common on the Continent until
the middle of the 19th century and in England until 1925. See, e.g., ALEJANDRO
M. GARRO, THE LOUISIANA PuBLIc REcoRDs DoCTRusu AND THE CivnL LAW TRADriON 46-48 (1989) (discussing the enactment of the Law of Transcription in

1855 in France); id. at 65-66 (discussing the enactment of the English Land
Registration Act in 1925).

23. ' he United States... is probably the only country in the world where
title security rests less on a public registry than in the hands of a private industry composed of attorneys, abstractors, and title insurance companies." GARRO,
supra note 22, at 4.
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recorded.2 4 Nevertheless, the purchase and construction of seagoing vessels, which are particularly large and expensive sorts
of capital equipment, have been possible by resort to the market
for information, without relying on a recording system. Intriguingly, the official registration systems that exist for vessels seem
designed to serve efficiently the financiers likely to use them.
When nations must compete with one another for the privilege
of offering ship registry services, they are likely to design their
services so that they are convenient to potential ship-owner customers. For instance, one can register a vessel to carry the Liberian flag, record mortgages against the vessel, and make other
required filings by depositing the paperwork, not in Monrovia,
simibut rather in New York City.25 The Republic of Vanuatu,
26
larly, maintains its ship registry offices in New York.
Particularly in the case of Article 9, it has long been known
that assurances of the validity and priority of a security interest
can be given only when facts not evident from the filing are
known. Lender's counsel needs to determine, among other
things, that: (1) the borrower actually owns the collateral and
has had possession for longer than ten days; (2) the collateral
has been constantly within the jurisdiction for at least four
months; (3) the collateral was not purchased with the proceeds
of other validly pledged collateral; (4) the collateral is not in the
possession of any other secured party; and (5) the borrower's
name has not changed in the recent past. These facts, and several others necessary to assuring the priority of a client's secur27
ity interest, are simply not apparent from public records.
Since Article 9 was adopted, lenders who need this information
have been obliged to obtain it, not in the filing system, but instead in the market for information. In many cases, it may be
true that the information furnished by an Article 9 filing would
be a joint product of the process that produces the unfiled infor-

24. See, e.g., WILLIAM
25.

TErLEY, MAARIIME LENS AND CLAIMs 399-403 (1985).
REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, BUREAU OF MARITIME AFFAIRS, REQUIREMENTS

FOR VESSEL REGISTRATioN AND RECORDING OF INSTRUMENTS part I, § A 1 (1989).
26. REPBUC OF VANUATU, SHIP REGISTRY AND FNANCL SERVICES REGULATIONS ch. 1, § 1 (1990).

27. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerizationof the Article 9 FilingSystem: Thoughts on Building the Electronic Highway, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1992, at 5, 6-15 (discussing the relevance of the foregoing facts in detail and citing other studies arguing that the information provided by the Article 9 system is unreliable).
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mation,28 in which case the net gain from the administrative
procedure of filing is nearly zero.
C.

THE INEFFICIENCY OF FILING SYsTEMs is INFERABLE FROM
THEIR HISTORY

That recording systems are likely to provide search cost and
authentication cost savings is most plausible in the case of relatively more valuable assets, particularly those assets having
very long lives. For example, ownership may turn on ancient
facts that are expensive to prove. The history of recording of interests in land, however, seems inconsistent with the hypothesis
that grantors and grantees might rush to record in order to capture the increases in land values occasioned by the savings in
search and authentication costs. The history of land recording
systems in England is so colorfully to the contrary that it is
worth summarizing here.
The first general British statute requiring the recording of
conveyances in interests in land was the Statute of Enrollments,
enacted in 1535.29 It provided that no "bargain and sale" conveyance of a freehold was effective against a third party, unless
it was in writing and enrolled in one of the king's courts.3 0 From
and after 1535, however, conveyancing lawyers in England
adopted the technique of conveying land by "lease and release,"
under which the buyer leased the land and, after entering into
possession, obtained a release of the reversion from the "seller."
The result conveyed a fee simple estate, but because the conveyance was not by bargain and sale, it was not subject to the recording requirement under the Statute of Enrollments. Lease
and release became the standard mode of land transfer in England, such that by the nineteenth century, conveyances could
take the form of the release of the reversion of a nonexistent,
totally fictional lease!3 ' Conveyance by deed did not become
common until the nineteenth century, and recording was not required in England until the early twentieth century. Even
though the sorts of interests and the value and longevity of the
28.

Cf. KrrcH, supra note 18, at 9-10 (arguing that the disclosure require-

ments in securities laws may be justified because the information, being a product of normal record keeping, is nearly costless for issuers to produce but is
highly valuable to existing and potential investors).
29. 27 Hen. 8, ch. 16 (Eng.).
30. Prior thereto, land had been conveyed mostly by the strictly oral and
physical ceremony of enfeoffment (livery of seisin). The Statute of Frauds,
which required that conveyances be written, was not enacted until 1677.
31. This history summarizes MEGARRY & WADE, supra note 18, at 171-74.
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assets involved make the case for filing systems most intuitively
appealing, history does not attest to their probable efficiency.
D.

THm

FILiNG SYSTEM OPERATES AS A BANKRUPTCY TAX

If filing is costly to filers and provides a free ride for information users, the mystery arises-why does anybody file? The
foregoing analysis predicts that while mortgagees might take
their interests in recordable form, they will not voluntarily record them. Under the current law of nonbankruptcy creditors'
remedies, all the mortgagee needs to do is monitor whether the
mortgagor is a defendant in any litigation. If the mortgagee incurs any judgments, the mortgagee can then file before any judgment creditor obtains an execution writ, delivers it to the sheriff,
and gets the sheriff to seize the collateral. Consequently, no
creditor needs to file until after the debtor has suffered an adverse judgment. The filing fees and disclosure losses may be
smaller than the cost of monitoring the debtor for such litigation, of course, but perhaps not in all cases. Even so, mortgagees
can invest in locating assets on which they believe they can file
before a sheriff will be able to locate them and thus can monitor
for judgments alone.
What has made this strategy for saving the filing expense
too risky for lenders in the last century is the misguided determination of Article 9's drafters to make priority among secured
parties turn on the dates of filing.8 2 Even if the drafters were to

rescind their decision to pick first filers as winners in Article 9's
priority race contests, however, the strong-arm clause of the
Bankruptcy Code would still compel filing.33 What must be
monitored in a bankruptcy regime are not objective events, like
ongoing litigation, but rather the subjective likelihood that the
borrower will file a bankruptcy petition. If he or she does, the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code operate as if a judgment
creditor had been able to employ Tinker Bell as the sheriff.
Tinker Bell levies by sprinkling pixie dust into the wind. The
wind blows the dust onto all assets, no matter how hard they
32. U.C.C. § 9-312(5). Because the possibility of future filing secured lenders or purchasers is harder to determine than is the possibility of judgment
creditors, risk-averse lenders will always have a strong inducement to file. On
the other hand, what new lenders and purchasers take out of the debtor's estate
is likely to be replaced in part by new assets that the lenders and purchasers
contribute. One can thus argue that it would be less critical for early secured
lenders to monitor for these later transactions than it is to monitor for judgments, which can subtract assets without adding any.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
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would be for a real creditor and his or her real sheriff to find and
seize. The assets, of course, fly away once Tinker Bell coats
them with the dust. Filing is thus the only alternative available
to a lender to protect whatever inframarginal rents for which it
has contracted in the loan transaction.
The filing system consequently operates as if it were a tax
on secured transactions. In the ongoing debate as to whether
the costs of the bankruptcy system are significant, then, one
should add the cost of maintaining and using the filing system.
Without bankruptcy law, one could conceivably evade the tax.
There is good reason to believe that bankruptcy legislation is intended mainly to chisel secured creditors out of their bargains.
More likely, it only results in making secured financing more
expensive by raising the costs of secured transactions.3 4 The efficiency losses resulting from the artificial inflation of the costs
of these transactions are exceedingly difficult to quantify. The
direct costs of the filing system, however, are determinable, and
cost ledger in the debate over
should be added to the bankruptcy
35
the costs of bankruptcy.
I. THE CURRENT SYSTEM, EVEN IF JUSTIFIABLE,
OUGHT NEVERTHELESS TO BE REORGANIZED-ITS
PRIMARY PROBLEMS ARE ORGANIZATIONAL, NOT
TECHNOLOGICAL
Even if we assume that the Article 9 filing system creates
net welfare, it is still legitimate to ask whether it delivers as
welfare as it is capable of delivering and, if not, whether it
much
minimizes the welfare losses that it otherwise imposes. Whizbang computer programs, changes in the place-of-filing rules,
and other technological monkeying with the system seem directed to this latter question. If the system is inefficient, there is
good reason to reduce the cost of the services it does provide, and
to enhance their value as well.
Nevertheless, whatever is technologically wrong with the
system can be rendered largely unimportant. We can mitigate
or cure any serious problems that filing systems create by or34. Cf. James W. Bowers, Rehabilitation,Redistribution or Dissipation:
The Evidence for Choosing Among Bankruptcy Hypotheses, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
955, 965-67 (1994) (critiquing the hypothesis that Chapter 11 bankruptcies redistribute the wealth of secured parties).
35. This argument is implicit in Professor White's proposal to amend Article 9 so that unperfected secured creditors' claims will take priority over trustees in bankruptcy under the strong-arm clause. James J. White, Revising
Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation,26 Loy. LA. L. REv. 823, 823-25 (1993).
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ganizing them better. A properly privatized system, for example, encourages those who own the system to adopt any
advantageous technologies, without a legislative mandate. The
Article 9 Study Committee recommends that the redrafters of
amending it to permit the privatization of the
Article 9 consider
filing system. 36

A. TIEORIES JUSTIFYING PUBLIC

OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION

OF SERVICES Do NOT JUSTIFY THE CURRENT FILING

SYSTEMS
The unvarying feature of the current Article 9 filing system
is that public officials keep the files. Every state's section 9-401
designates one or more public officials' offices as the exclusive
places where secured parties must give notice of the existence of
their security interests. Several social scenarios exist under
which the decision to have public officials provide economic services is regarded as rational. None, however, provides a very
strong justification for the existing Article 9 filing system. In
this section, I examine whether any of the four generally accepted reasons to have services provided by a government applies to the Article 9 filing system.
1.

The Case of Public Goods and Free Riders

Filing systems must be justified as systems to communicate
information. Indeed, there is a naive view of information economics that might seem to provide some theoretical support for
their necessity. Information has long been recognized as an economic resource or asset, but one which also possesses the qualities of the quintessential public good. It is nonrivalrous and
nonexclusive in its essence; that is, the use of information by one
person does not preclude its use by limitless others.3 7 If information is a public good, the first postulate of the economics of
information is that information will be chronically underproduced, because those who bear the costs of producing it cannot exclude free riders. Accordingly, it would be justifiable for
us to establish subsidies to increase the production of public
36. PEB REPORT, supra note 5, at 90 ("The Drafiing Committee may also
wish to consider textual changes that would facilitate or make possible.., the
privatization of a state's filing system.").

37. JoHN F. DUE & ANN F. FRIEDLAENDER, GOvERNMENT FINANCE: Eco-

NOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 25-26 (7th ed. 1981).
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goods. Ironically, however, our existing system functions not as
38
a subsidy but as a tax.
If borrowers and lenders, left to their own devices, will underproduce valuable information, one might argue that it is possible to correct directly the perverse incentives that lead to
underproduction. What borrowers and lenders will not voluntarily disclose, we will force them to make public. The fallacy in
this approach, however, is that the information is not a public
good until after it has been conscripted. The problem that gives
rise to the perverse incentives of a public good is the infinite
costliness involved in excluding free riders from the benefits of
the good. Possessors of information, on the other hand, have a
less expensive means of excluding free riders. They can simply
choose not to reveal their information to anyone who does not
pay for it. Thus, it is not the inherent quality of information
that leads to a free rider problem in information about the ownership of assets. It is the conscription itself that produces the
public goods problem.
2.

Public Regulation and Negative Externalities

The public goods case for the governmental provision of
services is founded on the supposed problem created by positive
externalities-free riders. The converse of this position is the
need for public regulation of activity that, if furnished by markets, would impose significant negative externalities. Indeed,
the standard legal argument for requiring a filing in order to
perfect a security interest against third parties takes this form.
If third parties might detrimentally be misled into dealing with
a debtor by the secrecy of a security interest, then a publicly run
filing system can provide an antidote to this risk of a negative
external effect on the ignorant third party.3 9 Disclosure by the
secured lender, this argument assumes, permits the third party
to protect itself more cheaply than any other technique it has
available to it.
For the current Article 9 filing system, and some of its analogues, these assumptions turn out to be heroic. The negative
externality rationale may explain why we ought to require dis38. See supratext accompanying note 33 (discussing the strong-arm clause
of the Bankruptcy Code).
39. Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STmU. 53 (1983) (arguing that filing systems eliminate the
external effects of creditor reliance on the debtor's "ostensible ownership" of the
collateral). But see Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL
STU. 209 (contending that Baird's conclusion was in error).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:721

closure, but not why filing with public officials is the most efficient way to effectuate disclosure. There is every reason to
believe that disclosure to a local, privately run credit bureau
would be at least as cheap and effective a way to protect the atrisk third parties. What is more, at-risk third parties are in a
position to protect themselves and, indeed, seem routinely capable of doing so. Article 9, in fact, assiduously separates future
third parties who might be relying on the lack of information
about the existence of a security interest from those who, presumably, are less likely to be relying third parties. 40 Ironically,
the trustee in bankruptcy, the least likely of all to have been a
is the most likely beneficiary of the filing
misled third 4party,
1
requirement.
In particular, if the information that filing discloses is valuable to third parties, then there is good reason to require the
third parties to pay for the value they receive. Only if they do,
are we likely to develop a reliably efficient equilibrium quantity
of disclosure. Indeed, it is precisely because the public officials
running the filing system charge not only the consumers, but
also the providers of the information, that we can conclude the
filing system is both inefficient and explainable primarily as a
rent-seeking exercise of governmental power. If there was
money to be made collecting the information and selling it, the
market would undoubtedly have provided collection and disclosure services without the need for legislation. In short, the case
for requiring filing with a public agency because of the existence
of negative externalities is, at the very best, an extremely uneasy one.
3.

Redistribution

The next excuse for having a public agency provide any service is that the service is an ideal fulcrum for applying the leverage of an income redistribution policy. No one, however, is
arguing that the Article 9 filing system was planned or is justifiable on this basis. Among other reasons why redistribution does
not credibly justify the filing system is that the most typical
40. See supra note 16 (noting that creditors' probability of reliance may
explain Article 9's priority scheme).
41. David Gray Carlson, The Trustee's StrongArn Power Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 S.C. L. Rav. 841, 912-20 (1992) (arguing that the strong arm
power, in the name of eliminating secret liens, also promotes strategic behavior
in bankruptcy, and creates windfalls to nonrelying claimants); White, supra
note 35, at 826-30 (arguing that it is fair to subordinate bankruptcy trustees to
unperfected security interests).
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filers and users seem to be the same people-banks. The most
plausible redistributive analysis of the structure of the filing
system, then, seems to be that it is designed to take value from
people, pass it through the pockets of bureaucrats, and return
most, but not all, of the value to the initial contributors. While
calling a rent-seeking structure redistributive might be technically accurate, it is nevertheless normatively unattractive as a
justification.
4. The Existence of a Natural Monopoly
The last widely accepted justification for the policy of providing services through a public agency is that the marginal
costs of the services are continuously declining at the levels of
output that will credibly be demanded. The provision of such
services will, in equilibrium, eventually be furnished by a single
firm, a natural monopoly. 42 So long as the services are provided
at their marginal cost, furnishing them through a monopoly is
desirable, although markets will not induce monopolists to price
their product at their marginal costs. If public agencies operate
the monopoly, it might be thought, then political will could affect
prices and keep them at the marginal cost levels. 43 It should be
noted, however, that it would be difficult to argue that natural
monopoly considerations justify the existing system. Although
local filing seems irrational under natural monopoly conditions,
it is not atypical. If we take natural monopoly considerations
seriously, there is some reason to think that pressures to federalize the system or treaty proposals to create multi-state central
systems would have been vigorously pushed.
Finally, there is very little reason to believe that the public
agents who furnish the services of the filing system today, or
have been doing so for the last thirty years, have been modifying
their prices to continuously assure that they reflect the marginal
cost of the services. Indeed, there is reason to believe that
granting the monopoly to bureaucrats does not create any particular incentives for the bureaucrats to price their services efficiently. Thus, the natural monopoly justification for the use of
public agencies to provide services is not likely to apply credibly
to the case of the Article 9 filing system.
42. DuE & FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 37, at 91-93.
43. I reveal below why there is some theoretical reason to believe that the
provision of information through a filing system might be a natural monopoly. I
also make recommendations to redesign the filing system to minimize the dead
weight costs imposed by the monopoly.
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THE BENEFITS OF ORGANIZATION

1. The Question of How Fees Are Set
A system like that adopted in Louisiana protects the local
filing interests while providing all the technological benefits of
central filing.44 One might argue, then, that the Louisiana Compromise represents a triumph for efficiency, except that it lacks
a critical organizational feature. The triumph of the Louisiana
clerks was not so much in the requirement of continued exclusive local filing. Rather it was the decision to have the fees for
filing set by the legislature! If any secured party doing a deal in
Shreveport is authorized to file in New Orleans, or vice versa,
then the possibility exists that the clerks of all the parishes
might be thrown into competition with one another. Had the
new filing system permitted the Louisiana clerks to set their
own fees, one could expect the forces of competition to have set
an equilibrium price for the services of the filing system at a
level approaching their marginal costs. Brothers-in-law might
have found continued employment in such a system, but only if
they were efficient workers. Indeed, if we could write network
programs to access the filing information compiled by each local
clerk, we would not need central filing. The resulting system
would deliver the goods that filing systems provide under competitive conditions, assuring us efficient results.45
2. The Possibility of Technological Efficiencies
It might appear that the technology is such that large, central computer databases provide filing and searching services at
lower cost than networks, largely because the centralized system minimizes the number of communication channels that the
system needs. The diagram below illustrates the number of
44. See supra part I (discussing Louisiana's filing system).
45. When the clerks are given a monopoly over the services at a rate fixed
by law, there is reason to believe that the monopoly rents can still be dissipated
as long as the system places the clerks in competition with each other. It is, for
example, worthwhile for the clerk of a parish distant from a commercial center
to spend resources advertising its services, or offering under-the-table considerations to the lenders and borrowers at that center, to convince them to do their
filing farther away from home. The possibility exists that nonprice competition
provides services to the filers at something close to the net cost approximating
the marginal costs of the services. Were this true, however, one would then
expect the clerks to find it fruitless to have the legislature fix the prices for
filing and searching. The shape of the legislation adopted indicates that that is
not the case. There is, nevertheless, some anecdotal reason to believe that a
few Louisiana clerks are indulging in some nonprice competition in the offering
of credit terms, free courier services and the like to large-volume filers.
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communication channels required of a system organized like
Louisiana's, with three local clerks, a central storage and search
facility, and three searchers.
POTENTIAL COMMUNICATION CHANNELS IN A
CENTRAL FACILITY/LOCAL FILING SYSTEM
Filer #1

Filer #2

Filer #3

Clerk #1

Clerk #2

Cle

)K Centra Each

Searcher #11

Searcher #21

#3

/l

Searcher #3

The solid lines indicate the minimum number of communication channels a Louisiana-type system would require. There
is only a single link between each filer and each clerk on the
assumption that any filer will likely file with only one clerk,
probably the nearest one, to minimize travel or communication
costs. The dotted lines' added to connect each fier with each
clerk are those communications channels that filers might rationally use were the clerks truly in competition with each other.
In that case, each filer might have occasion to deal with each
clerk, assuming that each would, on occasion, offer superior competitive terms. The additional dotted lines, from each searcher
to each clerk, similarly indicate the extra communication channels potentially required in a networked search system.
Thus, one might argue that the filing system is a natural
monopoly-that the services it provides are producible at continuously declining marginal costs, because the central monopolist organization requires the fewest communication channels.
If the marginal costs of a practical, centralized system are substantially lower than the marginal costs of a practical,
networked system, the price for the services charged by a monopolist may in fact be lower than a truly competitive price, be-
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cause the cost of the competition is the maintenance of
expensive but unnecessary communication links. That argument, however, is not obviously a winner. Just what constitutes
a "communications channel" is unclear. For example, our current network of telephone lines may permit one to argue that
the costs of the extra channels are largely "sunk" rather than
marginal costs, in which case communication costs do not create
a natural monopoly.
IV. OPTIMAL ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO
TECHNOLOGICAL MONOPOLIES
If a centralized system entails continuously declining marginal costs, one might argue that the filing system, organized as
a state monopoly, is economically justifiable. Nonetheless, there
is good theoretical reason to believe that there are superior ways
in which to organize the use of a technology that produces natural monopolies.
A. TIM

POSSIBIu'TY OF A CoAsEAN AUCTION

In the 1950s, Ronald Coase first proposed, in the case of
licenses to use the electromagnetic spectrum, that the grant of
property rights could efficiently be auctioned off rather than
awarded through the political process. 4 6 The gravamen of his
position was simple: The highest bidder at any auction was
likely to be the person or firm valuing most highly the particular
property rights. The auction technique thus would tend to result in resources finding their way into the hands of the highest
47
valuing users, a feature of any optimal distributive system.
We probably cannot get too excited, however, about the
prospect of awarding a franchise to the highest bidder for the
rights to collect the rent-seeking profits from the UCC filing system. The current system, which awards the rents to democratically elected politicians, might not tend to arrive at the same
place as an auction, although to the extent that elections are
won by those willing to invest the most in campaigning for office,
46. R.H. Coase, The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON.
1, 35-40 (1959).
47. Because the person who can operate the system at lowest cost is likely
to be among those who will profit most from owning it, the auction also tends to
deliver resources into the hands of those who have low costs of transforming
them into valuable outputs.
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the differences between the current system and one privatized
by auction may not be especially significant. 48
B. ALTERNATrVES TO THE COASEAN AUCTION
Coase's ideas, however, reveal another possibility. If we
were to reconceptualize our goals for the system so that our wish
is that the services of the filing system, justifiable or not, at least
be delivered at a price approximating their marginal cost, the
auction technique is still a viable alternative. If the state were
not interested in using the auction to raise the maximum
amount of'sales proceeds from the award of property rights, but,
instead, desired an efficient allocation of resources, it might
choose not to award to the highest bidder, but rather to the bidder promising to charge the lowest prices to filers and searchers.
So long as bidders in such a system were bound to provide the
services at the prices they specifed in their bids, the winning
bidders will tend to come from the set of lowest cost service providers, and the services will tend to be provided
at prices approxi49
mating their anticipated marginal costs.
To suggest that we can design an auction that will tend to
create incentives for the optimal provision of filing services is
not to say that the engineering problem is trivial. Among other
things, the auction would have to be organized to create a detailed description of the services that the winning bidder was
obliged to provide. As does any bidder who is awarded a fixedprice contract, the bidder winning a low-price auction would
emerge with a strong incentive to chisel on the actual value of
the services it provides. Unless the services were defined in detail, for example, the winning bidder could offer to provide them,
but only after long delays, unless future users of the system
agree to pay bribes to guarantee timely receipt of the services.
An auctioning off of the filing system to the private party
promising to deliver its services at the lowest price does not com48. Cf. RicHARD POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 39-41 (3d ed. 1986)
(arguing that competition for broadcast licenses in the administrative arena,
which tends to deliver broadcast rights to those willing to pay the most in fighting costs, produces results much like those of an initial auction, but less
efficiently).
49. 1 owe this thought to John Bigelow. Bigelow also believes that the lowprice bidder will include some insurance premium in his bid price to provide for
the uncertainty that his estimate of future marginal costs will be in error. That
the filers must pay not only the present marginal cost of the service, but also for
the risk imposed on the contractor who runs the filing archives, however, is not
a serious departure from the conditions of optimal provision of the services of
the system.
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pletely assure us that the natural monopoly problem has effectively been solved, however. With their prices fixed by the
legislature, today's local clerks and central secretaries of state
have incentives to economize on the costs that they might incur, 50 just as would the winning bidder in the low-bid-price-wins
auction. The ceiling on prices, however, removes one other important incentive that we might wish to have influence the operator of the filing system. An entrepreneur has every reason to
cut costs, even if that means firing his or her brother-in-law. He
or she also has an incentive to improve the product to make it
more valuable to consumers, but only if he or she has the latitude to charge for the increased value being delivered.
The technological issues that plague the current systemwhat is the optimal place to file, under what name, how information is disclosed if collateral becomes proceeds, and the like-all
involve the issue of making the system more valuable to its
users. We can sit in our law school libraries and speculate on
what version of these possibilities the users of the system actually want and would be willing to buy, but as long as none of us
has to put up any money to make it happen-we stand to lose
nothing if our speculations are inaccurate-there is not any parto credit our speculative insights as being worth
ticular reason
5
very much. '
CONCLUSION
In summary, it is possible, by various auction techniques, to
create filing systems that are apt to create more efficient outcomes than the existing system, because they create the appropriate incentives for those who own and operate the system.
Neither of the two most obviously beneficial types of auctions,
however, create a full array of the appropriate incentives. Thus,
50. Note that the clerks in a Louisiana-type system, who get to keep the

savings from any economizing measures they develop, and can use them to hire
more of their in-laws, have stronger incentives to ni mize costs than do the
Minnesota clerks who must remit all their funds to the legislature and beg for
funding to cover the costs of their operations.
51. That people's perceptions of reality are greatly sharpened when they
have money on the line is colorfully illustrated by an experiment in predicting
the outcome of elections. Researchers have created "electoral stock markets,"
which permit investors who estimate election outcome by percentage of votes
won by both candidates to earn large returns based on how accurate their predictions turn out to be. The "marketP price winning percentages tend to be
more precisely accurate than the results of ordinary scientific polling. See Richard Morin, For Those Who Think PoliticiansCan Be Bought and Sold, WAsH.
POST NAT'L WKLY. ED., Feb. 7-13, 1994, at 37.
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while privatization can improve the efficiency of the system, it
cannot cure all its defects. If the system can be improved, however, it should be, even if the improvements do not yield perfect
results. Nevertheless, because all organizational improvements
have suboptimal facets, there is good reason for eschewing them
in favor of abolishing the filing requirement altogether.

